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Abstract 
Short-term rentals have facilitated the upraise trend in tourism growth in several cities around the world. However, 
concerns for the negative effects that such home-sharing platforms may have on the housing market and traditional 
markets have driven community groups and housing advocates to intensely react against them. Whether or not short-
term rentals increase housing prices and rents for local residents is an empirical question. We quantify the causal effects 
of Airbnb´s short-term rentals on urban housing affordability in Portugal by estimating quarterly housing rents and 
prices as a function of Airbnb concentration. We take advantage of the 2014 regulatory reform and employ a difference-
in-differences (DiD) empirical strategy. We estimate an overall increase in property values of 34% and 10.9% for rents 
due to the short-term lease regulatory reform. We also find that these effects are particularly localized to the historical 
centers and areas attractive to tourists in the cities of Lisbon and Porto. A better understanding of the effects of short-
term home rentals on housing markets and of the magnitude of its impact on residential property prices and rents are 
crucial information to determine whether it needs to be regulated and how proper regulation should be designed.  
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1. Introduction 
While a beautiful image of a city is one of the backbones for tourism, peer-to-peer online marketplaces 
that facilitate matching between demanders and suppliers of short-term rentals such as Airbnb, Homestay 
or Bedycasa have facilitated the upraise trend in tourism growth in several cities around the world. However, 
concerns for the negative effects that such home-sharing platforms may have on the housing market and 
traditional markets have driven community groups and housing advocates to intensely react against them.  
Critics of Airbnb and of similar home-sharing platforms argue that these platforms increase home prices 
by restricting the supply of long-term rentals exacerbating local affordability issues (Lee 2016)  and, present 
unfair competition to traditional suppliers of short-term lodging such as hotels (Zervas et al. 2017). In fact, 
hotel associations complain that short-term home rentals function as hotels but have the unfair advantage of 
not paying taxes or comply with safety and zoning regulations. Critics further allege that home-sharing 
platforms can contribute to racialized gentrification as some hosts are prone to reject certain minority groups 
(Edelman and Luca 2014, Edelman et al. 2017) and, also to a decrease on resident’s quality of life due to 
noise, congestion, safety concerns and competition for scarce parking, as neighborhoods get transformed 
into hotel districts (Cocola-Gant 2016). Moved by these concerns, attempts have been made to regulate or 
even to ban provision of these services in several cities around the world.1 On the other hand, those who 
favor home-sharing platform's rentals tend to focus on its positive economic impact on the city, including 
creating new income streams for residents as well as encouraging the rehabilitation of the housing stock and 
tourism and its associated economic benefits for a city as a whole (Kaplan and Nadler 2015).  
The goal of this paper is to provide empirical evidence to this debate by quantifying the causal effects of 
Airbnb´s short-term home rentals on urban housing affordability in Portugal. In recent year, national prices 
of long-term housing have been rising faster than overall consumer prices and wages. Moreover, because 
demand for housing is relatively inelastic, small changes in housing supply can cause significant changes in 
the cost of housing (Albouy et al. 2016). This inelastic behavior generates concerns over its impact on 
consumer welfare. The increase in the cost of long-term housing has then become a much-discussed policy 
challenge that has spurred much debate on the impacts that Airbnb may have on housing affordability.   
To identify the causal impact of Airbnb concentration on house prices and rents, we take advantage of 
the Portuguese 2014 regulatory reform Decreto-Lei n.º 128/2014 and employ a difference-in-differences 
(DiD) empirical strategy. The 2014 regulatory reform greatly simplifies the process of entering into the 
                                               
1Some cities have laws that restrict the ability to host paying guests for short periods (e.g. Amsterdam, New York, 
Paris, San Francisco). In many other cities, the host must register (e.g. Lisbon), get a permit (e.g. Barcelona, Berlin, 
Paris and San Francisco), or obtain a license (e.g. Cape Elizabeth) before the host lists the property or accepts guests. 
Certain types of short-term bookings may be prohibited altogether (e.g. Berlin and New York) and in other cases the 
measures include paying a rental tax (e.g. Amsterdam and San Francisco). Local governments vary greatly in how they 
enforce these laws, but penalties may include fines or other enforcement.  
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short-term sublet business in Portugal. It consists of a change in legislation to simplify a series of 
bureaucratic procedures to a situation that requires only a pre-registration of the property with the 
Portuguese Registry Office of Short-Term Rentals before the host lists the property on a hosting platform 
or accepts guests. This change in the rental policy realm has in turn induced effects to the nationwide housing 
market by facilitating the operation of informal vacation rentals. Moreover, the policy change generates an 
exogenous source of variation to the number of Airbnb listings in Portugal that allows us to circumvent the 
endogeneity issues that are inherent to this type of research. 
Using data we collected from Airbnb, quarterly housing rents and prices from approximately 100 
municipalities in Portugal dating back to 2010, and several other auxiliary datasets to compile controls, we 
thus quantify the extent to which Airbnb listings concentration has impacted house prices and rents in the 
country. We pay particular attention to Lisbon and Porto, the two main cities in the country which have 
experienced both rapidly rising housing costs and growth in Airbnb listings since 2011. Our DiD strategy 
identifies the Airbnb treatment effect by comparing differences in house prices in municipalities 
differentially affected by Airbnb before and after the regulatory reform for the period 2011-2016. For 
robustness we also report results from an instrumental variable strategy similar to Barron et al. (2018). In 
that case, the proportion of Airbnb houses on a given municipality in a given quarter are instrumented by 
the online search for Airbnb on Google. The instrument is the interaction of Google time trends for the word 
“Airbnb” with the share of properties on Airbnb in the first quarter of 2014 (before the policy change).   
We find an overall increase in property values of 34% and 10.9% for rents due to the 2014 regulatory 
reform.  These magnitudes can also be translated into percent changes in Airbnb presence. As such, a 1% 
increase in the Airbnb listing rate (that is, in the share of Airbnb listings to the number of housing units) 
results in a 4.5% average increase in property values and a 2.26% increase in rents. Our results are robust 
to wide range of placebo-tests and specification alternatives. Furthermore, we also find that these effects are 
particularly localized to the historical centers and areas attractive to tourists in the cities of Lisbon and Porto. 
 
Portugal as a case study 
Portugal is an interesting case to study. The country is currently experiencing a tourism boom that boosts 
the economy, but also puts added strains on municipal services and affordable housing for local residents.2  
However, while some European cities were tightening regulations applied to short-term rentals via 
websites to keep housing affordable and protect residents from noisy visitors, Lisbon took steps in 2014 to 
                                               
2 According to the 2018 latest statistics made available by the Institute for Tourism Planning and Development (IPDT), 
Lisbon and Porto have a higher ratio of tourists to residents than renowned tourist spots Barcelona and Prague. Lisbon 
averages 4.5 million tourists per year, meaning that for every resident there are typically 9 tourists. Porto welcomes 
1.6 million tourists annually, the equivalent of 8 visitors per local. The ratio is even higher in Albufeira in the Algarve 
region on Portugal's south coast, where tourists outnumber locals by 39 to 1. 
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make short-term rentals easier.3 Government measures including phasing out rent controls and selling 
hundreds of empty buildings at public auctions have also helped support a rebirth of cities and the 
proliferation of short-term rentals since 2012.4 Moreover, the 2014 end of the year reform of Portaria n.º 
517/2008 and Decreto-Lei n.º 15/2014, the then existing Portuguese laws regulating the ability to host short-
term paying guests, has greatly simplified the licensing process of short-term rentals. 
The law, Decreto-Lei n.º 128/2014, mandates only a pre-registration of the unit with the Portuguese 
Registry Office of Short-Term Rentals (Registo Nacional de Estabelecimentos de Alojamento Local -
RNAL)  before the host (whether it is a large establishment such as a hotel or simply rooms in a private 
home that are occasionally rented) lists the property on a hosting platform or accepts guests. This has made 
the process of entering into the short-term sublet business in Portugal and in particular the operation of 
informal vacation rentals at the time simpler and faster.  
According to RNAL, the number of legal short-term sublets in Portugal increased from 13 thousand as 
of December 2014 to more than 55 thousand units as of December 2017.5 The majority of these registrations 
are concentrated in the municipalities of Lisbon (10.611), Porto (4.881) and Albufeira (4.815).     
 
Related Literature 
While local amenities (e.g. city parks, water bodies, cultural and historic amenities, noise) explain some 
of the variability in house prices within and across cities (Franco and Macdonald 2018a,b), quantity 
restrictions, natural geographic barriers and housing renewal programs have also been shown to impact 
property prices through a supply effect (Saiz 2010, Quigley and Raphael, 2005, Ihlanfeldt, 2007). Channels 
from both demand and supply sides can therefore contribute over time for the observed trend in rents and 
                                               
3 For example, in 2014 Barcelona’s local government imposed a moratorium on the concession of permits for short-
term rentals in an extended area in central Barcelona. Since then the number of legal short-term rentals in Barcelona 
has been frozen at 9600 units (Segu 2018). 
4 In 2012 a new urban lease law was enacted in Portugal to liberalize old rent contracts. The goal of this regulation was 
to remove market distortions that are the legacy of a complex succession of rent laws going back decades and thus, by 
removing rent freezes the reform hoped to increase the quality of the existing housing stock. The legislation set a five-
year period of transition from the old lease contracts to the new regime of free rent, and introduced measures to broaden 
the conditions under which renegotiation of open-ended residential leases could take place. The 2012 legislation, in 
turn, followed the implementation of a new model of urban rehabilitation in Portugal that started in 2004 with new 
incentives to stimulate private housing rehabilitation, especially in historic districts, and with the creation of urban 
rehabilitation companies that would allow cooperation between the private and public sectors. These housing policy 
reforms are believed to have also resulted in substantial rent increases in the country.  
5 In 2017, more rigorous legislation was approved in Portugal to regulate short-term rental properties. This is outside 
our period of analysis.  As of July 1, 2017, properties posted on Airbnb, Booking, Homeaway and other platforms need 
to be enrolled on the national tourism register. To be allowed to advertise on such platforms, property owners will have 
to fill in a required field with the registration number of their accommodation. Platforms will be subject to sanctions 
if they market non-registered properties. This measure was set to guarantee the rules of legal competition. 
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house prices. However, Airbnb housing rentals can potentially exacerbate rising rent costs through both 
supply and demand mechanisms.  
Short-term rentals can be an additional source of income for homeowners which in turn spurs the demand 
for housing space and rents. Moreover, by potentially leading to a reallocation of the housing stock from 
the long-term to the short-term markets and by generating nuisances on nearby properties, short-term rentals 
like Airbnb may also impact the property market. So, whether or not Airbnb rentals or other home-sharing 
types increase housing costs for local residents is an empirical question. A better understanding of the effects 
of short-term home rentals on housing markets and of the magnitude of its impact on residential prices and 
rents are imperative to determine whether it needs to be regulated and how proper regulation should be 
designed. Regulation might then be necessary to avoid the long term impacts of excessive tourism in terms 
of population displacement and/or excess gentrification. Besides, there might be social welfare 
considerations regarding the effect of house prices on the most vulnerable groups of the population. 
Despite the public debate, apparent anecdotal evidence and regulatory bans, the research literature on 
how home-sharing impact cities and in particular the housing market is still thin, meaning that wider 
applicability to other cities and contexts is unclear.  
Published academic studies on Airbnb are mostly tourism studies (Guttentag, 2015; Zervas et al. 2016), 
although some studies have also addressed the regulation of the share economy overall (Morgan and Kuch, 
2015) and short-term rentals in particular (Gottlieb, 2013; Palombo, 2015). Recently Gurran and Phibbs 
(2017) examine the expansion of Airbnb listings in the Sydney metropolitan area, focusing on implications 
for urban policy and planning.  
We are aware of only seven other academic papers that directly study the effect of Airbnb on housing 
rents and prices. With the exception of Segu (2018) who focuses her study in the city of Barcelona, the other 
six studies focus on either a specific US Market (see for example Lee (2016) for Los Angeles, Horn and 
Merante (2017) for Boston, Sheppard and Udell (2018) and Wachsmuth et al. (2018) for New York city, 
Koster et al. (2019) for Los Angeles County) or on the entire US Market (Barron et al. 2018). In general, 
this emerging literature finds that Airbnb has a measurable effect on long-term housing supply and prices 
in the cities where it operates, raising housing costs for local residents.  
Horn and Merante (2017) use Airbnb listing data from Boston in 2015 and 2016 and, find that a one 
standard deviation increase in Airbnb listings relative to the total number of housing units in a census tract, 
is associated with a 0.4% increase in asking rents. The study further shows that for those census tracts in the 
highest decile of Airbnb listings relative to total housing units, this increase in asking prices ranges from 
1.3% to 3.1%.   
On the other hand, Barron et al. (2018) study the effect of Airbnb on the long-term rental market using 
a dataset of all US properties listed in Airbnb between 2011 and 2016. The study uses an IV approach where 
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Google trends of the search “Airbnb” is an instrument to identify the causal effect. Since this instrument is 
time variant but geographically invariant, the authors combined it with a measure of how “touristy” a 
zipcode is in a base year. The rational for this approach is that if a certain area attracts a lot of tourists and 
receives a sudden surge in online search interest for Airbnb, then any subsequent increase in Airbnb listings 
is caused by the increased demand from visitors for short-term rentals. The study finds that a one standard 
deviation increase in listings at the within-core based statistical area zipcode level raises rents by 0.54%. 
The authors explain that one reason for such a small impact is that most people offering short-term rentals 
are owner-occupiers rather than commercial operators running mini-hotels or “hotelization” of entire 
buildings. 
Wachsmuth et al. (2018) apply the regression results identified by Barron et al. (2018) to the increase in 
Airbnb rentals in New York City. They find a 1.4 percent increase in NYC rents from 2015 to 2017 due to 
Airbnb’s expansion in that city. For the median NYC renter, this implies a $384 annual increase in rent from 
2015 to 2017 due to Airbnb’s expansion over that time. 
Sheppard and Urdell (2018) look also at the impact of Airbnb listings on house prices in New York. In 
contrast to the former studies, this study applies not only a traditional hedonic approach but also a matched 
difference-in-differences strategy similar to Zervas et al. (2014).6 The first approach provides measures of 
the associational impact of Airbnb listings, while the second approach provides a causal effect by identifying 
treatment and control groups within the observational data.7 Since the authors have available a large number 
of individual sales both before and after Airbnb´s entry into the New York City market, they are able to 
apply quasi-experimental techniques to examine whether short-term rentals make New York City less 
affordable. The results from this study suggest that residential properties that are subject to the treatment of 
having Airbnb properties nearby when sold experienced an increase in price by 3.5% (if located far from 
the CBD (Wall Street) and with a treatment consisting of few Airbnb properties) to more than 65% for 
properties located near Wall Street and/or treated by having a larger number of Airbnb rentals nearby. 
More recently, Koster et al. (2019) apply a quasi-experimental approach to evaluate the causal impact of 
Airbnb properties on house prices in the context of Los Angeles County. In particular, the study uses a 
spatial regression discontinuity design combined with a difference-in-differences set up to examine the 
                                               
6 Zervas et al. (2014) have examined the impact of Airbnb on the hotel industry. The authors use a difference-in-
difference fixed effects strategy to identify the causal effect of Airbnb’s entry into the market on hotel revenues. The 
authors deal with the endogeneity issue by assuming that unobserved factors that could affect both Airbnb adoption 
and hotel room revenue do not systematically vary between cities and over time. The authors found that a 10% increase 
in Airbnb units results in a 0.38% decrease in hotel revenue, which is significant if we take account the exponential 
increase Airbnb has experienced. 
7 Treatment in this study means that a sale of a residential property took place at a time when there were Airbnb 
properties available within 300 meters of the sale property location. The construction of treatment and control groups 
were based on different methods such as nearest-neighbor matching, propensity-score matching and regression 
adjustment. 
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changes in the number of Airbnb listings and in house prices close to the borders of the cities that have 
implemented the Home-Sharing Ordinances.  The authors find the ordinances strongly reduced the number 
of Airbnb listings by 70% in the long run and reduced house prices by 3% on average and also rents by the 
same amount as house prices.  
Our paper contributes to this emerging literature on the effects of home-sharing on housing costs in two 
ways. On the one hand, our study takes advantage of a change in the Portuguese regulation of short-term 
rentals that affected not just the most important municipalities in Portugal but also the entire country. This 
in turn enables us to use a difference-in-differences approach to assess and quantify the causal effect of 
Airbnb listings in house prices and rents using a comprehensive dataset for a European country and assess 
more broadly the effects of Airbnb on housing affordability. We further check the robustness of our results 
using also an IV approach similar to Barron et al. (2018). In addition, while previous studies concentrate on 
the effects of strict short-rental regulations for short-term rentals in a particular city (see for example Koster 
et al. 2019), our study explores how loosen short-term housing rental regulations impacted the number of 
Airbnb listings and its effects on property and rental prices not only on major cities and touristy areas but 
overall in the country. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides an overview of the housing market in 
Portugal. Section 3 discusses our data sources, provides descriptive statistics and presents our identification 
strategy. We report and discuss our main results in section 4, followed by robustness checks of our findings. 
Finally, Section 5 offers conclusions.  
 
2. Overview of the Housing Market in Portugal 
This section offers a brief overview of the housing market in mainland Portugal by focusing on the two 
key features of the Portuguese housing market - trends of house prices and rents and spatial distribution of 
short-term rentals- that provide a context to our research. We focus only on mainland Portugal because we 
lack data on house prices and rental prices for the Portuguese island regions of Azores and Madeira.8 
We define as Alojamento local (AL) or short-term rentals any private property with less than 10 rooms 
that is offered on a short-term rent to either national or foreign tourists. Moreover the property is let out one 
or more times a year for a period that typically exceeds one month i.e. summer or winter let outs. But they 
can also be rented for days, weeks or months. All housing properties meeting this definition must also obey 
the holiday rental laws which seek to regulate short-term let out properties from private individuals and 
bring them in line with minimum lodging standards.   
                                               
8 Continental Portugal or mainland Portugal are terms used for the bulk of the Portuguese Republic, namely that part 
on the Iberian Peninsula and so in Continental Europe, having approximately 95% of the total population and 96.6% 
of the country's land. 
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Before illustrating the distribution of house prices and short-term rentals across administrative divisions 
of mainland Portugal over time, it is important to mention that the Portuguese constitution identifies three 
tiers of government: civil parishes (freguesias), municipalities (municípios) and administrative regions 
(regiões administrativas). The current administrative divisions of Portugal, are the 18 Districts in mainland 
Portugal and the 2 Autonomous Regions of Azores and Madeira. In Portugal, there are also 308 
municipalities (272 in mainland) and 3092 parishes (2882 in mainland). The Lisbon Metropolitan 
Area consists of 18 municipalities with a total population (2011 census) of 2,821,876. The Metropolitan 
Area of Porto consists of 17 municipalities with a total population (2011 census) of 1,759,524. Total 
population in the country (2011 census) is 10,562,178. 
 
2.1.  Prices in the Long-Term Housing Market  
House prices in the long-term residential market, as measured by transaction prices, have increased 14% 
in Lisbon from the 1st quarter of 2011 (2011Q1) to the 1st quarter of 2016 (2016Q1), while decreasing 20% 
in Porto and 12% in the rest of mainland Portugal. This discrepancy between Lisbon and the rest of the 
country can be better observed in Figure 1, where house prices in Lisbon and Porto are compared to the rest 
of mainland Portugal. The vertical line marks the date of the policy reform with the publication of 
DL128/2014. 
In line with anecdotal evidence, Figure 1 provides graphical evidence that there has been a change in 
the behavior of transaction prices after the change in the short-term rental regulation in the 3rd quarter of 
2014 (2014Q3), particularly for the cities of Porto and Lisbon.  
However, it is important to note that until 2011 Portugal had very solid rent controls in place that left 
little incentive for landlords to maintain properties, and high housing sales tax rates discouraged them also 
from wanting to sell. As a result, many buildings, particularly buildings in historic areas, were left relatively 
dilapidated and run-down. Then, in 2011, Portugal entered into a severe economic crisis that made the 
country unable to repay or refinance its government debt, resulting in a €78 billion bailout program. In 
2012, rent controls were rolled back considerably as a condition of the bailout program.9 In the meanwhile, 
the country entered into a significant tourism boom that has changed the landscape of Portugal, particularly 
in Lisbon and Porto.10 Thus, to isolate the effect of the 2014 short-term policy reform from the confounding 
effect of the rental market liberalization, we explore the differential evolution of house prices and rents in 
areas with touristic potential with the evolution of house prices and rents in areas with no touristic potential, 
                                               
9 In addition, a “golden visa” program was also launched whereby foreigners can invest in Portugal in a variety of 
ways such as buying real estate properties valued at €500,000 or more, in exchange for resident permits. The “golden 
visa” program has driven a total investment of around €3.8 billion as of April 2018, about €3.4 billion of which has 
been via purchases of property. 
10 The annual international arrivals to Portugal went from 4.8 million in 1997 to almost 13 million in 2017.  
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leading to our DiD specification. To identify the causal effect of Airbnb listings on house prices and rents, 
there must be touristic pressure which in turn leads to an increase in the demand for short-term rentals. 
 
Figure 1: Transaction Prices, in € per m2, in Lisbon, Porto and the rest of Mainland Portugal. 
 
 
In Figure 2, we illustrate the behavior of long-term rental prices over time. It is clear that a similar, 
though less pronounced pattern as that observed for transaction prices, also emerges in rental prices. 
Between the 3rd quarter of 2014 (2014Q3) and the 1st quarter of 2016 (2016Q1), rental prices increased from 
about 7.9€/m2 in Lisbon and Porto, and 4.7€/m2 in the rest of the country, to about 9.1€/m2 in Lisbon and 
Porto and 5€/m2 in the rest of the country. 
Figure 3 explores house price trends across civil parishes with small versus large presence of short-term 
rentals within the two largest cities in Portugal, Lisbon and Porto. These cities have very diverse 
neighborhoods, and therefore looking solely at citywide trends masks significant variation. 
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Figure 2: Value of rents, in € per m2, in Lisbon, Porto and the rest of Mainland Portugal. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Transaction Prices, in € per m2, in civil parishes within Lisbon, Porto.  
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It is clear from Fig. 3 that before the policy reform transaction prices were already increasing in both 
areas, with large and small presence of short-term rentals. Market liberalization may help explain the trend 
observed in both areas right before the policy change in 2014Q3. However, what is striking is that after the 
policy change in 2014Q3, areas with large presence of short-term rentals exhibit the strongest transaction 
price increases. It is this differential evolution in transaction prices that allows us to infer the causal effect 
of the 2014 policy change.  
 
Figure 4: Transaction price in € per m2, in the 1st quarter of 2015, in Mainland Portugal (on the 
right), Porto (on the upper-left) and Lisbon (on the lower-left). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, Figures 4 and 5 summarize our dataset and illustrate the regional differences in the value of 
rents and sales across municipalities in mainland Portugal and across civil parishes for Lisbon and Porto in 
the first quarter of 2015. Most of the regions covered in the dataset are coastal regions or district capitals, 
where 80% of the population in Portugal is concentrated. This is because that is where most housing 
transactions take place. The two maps present a similar pattern – housing costs, both in terms of rents and 
transaction prices, are highest in the cities of Lisbon (located in the costal central part of Portugal) and Porto 
(located in the Northern part of the country), and in the district of Faro located in the southern region of 
Algarve. Within the city of Lisbon housing costs are highest in the southern part, in the historic downtown 
12 
 
area of Baixa; in Parque das Nações, a newly built area well-endowed with environmental amenities; and 
in São Domingos de Benfica and Avenidas Novas.  
As for the city of Porto, prices are also highest in the historic center, the oldest area of the city classified 
as World Heritage by UNESCO since 1996 and comprising the civil parishes of Cedofeita, Santo Ildefonso, 
Sé, Miragaia, São Nicolau e Vitória. 
   
Figure 5: Rental values € per m2, in the 1st quarter of 2015, in Mainland Portugal (on the right), 
Porto (on the upper-left) and Lisbon (on the lower-left). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.  Number of Short-term Rentals 
The supply of short-term rentals in Portugal is officially registered with the National Tourist Registry - 
Registo Nacional de Alojamento Local (RNAL). The number of registers with the RNAL system increased 
substantially from 2014, with 1715 registers in 2013, 3386 in 2014 and 11 218 in 2015. As of 2016, there 
were already 32 622 short-term rentals registered in RNAL, 96% of those located in mainland Portugal. 
Table 1 presents the share of short-term rentals in RNAL database by district, municipality and civil parish 
relative to total for 2016. From Table 1, the majority of short-term rentals registered in RNAL are 
concentrated in the districts of Faro, Lisbon and Porto which together account for 82% of all registries in 
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this dataset in 2016. Similarly, the top five municipalities in mainland Portugal, all located in these three 
districts, account for nearly half of the hosts registries.  
When looking at the distribution of Airbnb listings the statistics are slightly different. Table 2 presents 
the share of Airbnb listings by district, municipality and civil parish relative to total listings for 2016.  As 
of 2016 there were almost 44 411 listings in this home-stay site. When looking at the distribution of the 
hosts by districts, Lisbon, Faro and Porto still account for the majority of the local rental listings, 
representing 74% of the hosts’ registries.    
 
Table 1: Share of short-term rentals in RNAL by district, municipality and civil parish in 2016.  
 
 DISTRICTS MUNICIPALITIES PARISHES 
1 Faro – 49.3% Lisbon (Lisbon) – 18.5% Sta. Maria Maior (Lisbon) – 5.3% 
2 Lisbon – 24.4% Albufeira (Faro) – 9.6% UF Cedofeita, … (Porto) – 5.0% 
3 Porto – 8.4% Portimão (Faro) – 7.5% Misericórdia (Lisbon) – 4.1% 
4 Leiria – 4.7% Porto (Porto) – 6.7% Sto. António (Lisbon) – 1.8% 
5 Setúbal – 2.9% Lagos (Faro) – 6.6% Arroios (Lisbon) – 1.7% 
 
Table 2:  Share of Airbnb listings by district, municipality and civil parish in 2016.  
 
 DISTRICTS MUNICIPALITIES PARISHES 
1 Lisbon – 32.0% Lisbon (Lisbon) – 21.3% UF Cedofeita, … (Porto) – 6.0% 
2 Faro – 27.7% Porto (Porto) – 9.4% Sta. Maria Maior (Lisbon) – 5.5% 
3 Porto – 12.9% Albufeira (Faro) – 5.2% Misericórdia (Lisbon) – 4.4% 
4 Leiria – 5.5% Loulé (Faro) – 4.1% Albufeira (Faro) – 4.3% 
5 Setúbal – 5.2% Lagos (Faro) – 3.9% Arroios (Lisbon) – 3.0% 
 
Figure 6 shows the number of new listings in the Airbnb site and in the RNAL database in the 
municipalities of Lisbon and Porto relative to the rest of the country from 2010 to 2016. Figure 7 illustrates 
the gap between the Airbnb listings for the municipalities of Lisbon and Porto and those observed in the 
RNAL site.  
Both figures reveal that right after the policy reform DL128/2014 was published there was a substantial 
increase in the number of listings in both sites but particularly in the number of listings for the rest of 
mainland Portugal within the RNAL website. The simplification of the RNAL registration process 
introduced by the policy change seemed to have created an incentive for more hosts, in particular those 
located outside the most important cities in mainland Portugal, to start renting their homes and rooms to 
tourists. It is thus this heterogeneity in the geographic distribution of short-term rentals that allows us to 
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estimate the causal effect of the 2014Q3 policy change on house and rental prices by allowing us to compare 
areas which were directly affected and areas that were not affected by the policy change. 
 
Figure 3: Number of new listings in the Airbnb site and in the RNAL dataset for Lisbon and Porto 
and for the rest of the country. 
 
Figure 4: Difference from Lisbon and Porto to the rest of Portugal in the number of new listings in 
RNAL and Airbnb. 
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3. Description of the Data  
We collect information on Airbnb listings data from web scrapes from the Airbnb website during the 
month of September 2016 for several municipalities in mainland Portugal. For every Airbnb listing we have 
the location of the listed property (address and georeferenced coordinates), the daily price, a range of 
characteristics of the listed property (e.g. number of rooms, number of bathrooms), the host id, the list of all 
reviews from guests who have stayed at the property and the year-month in which the user registered as a 
host on the platform. Our final Airbnb dataset contains 44 411 Airbnb listings spanning a period of 7 years, 
from 2011 to 2016. 
Average quarterly sale prices and housing rental prices from the 1st quarter of 2011 to the 1st quarter of 
2016 for 137 municipalities in Portugal and for all the civil parishes in the municipalities of Porto and Lisbon 
are obtained from Confidencial Imobiliário. This company is a data bank, being the only source in Portugal 
with statistical data on transaction prices and residential lease agreements. The 137 municipalities included 
in our dataset represent 35% of the existing municipalities in Portugal, encompassing 80% of the population 
living in the country. The reason for not covering all the municipalities in the country is that in many of the 
smaller municipalities there are no regular housing transactions so that no sale residential price data can be 
collected. For the same reason, with the exception of Lisbon and Porto, rental and house prices were just 
available at the municipality level. For Lisbon and Porto those sale prices were also available at the civil 
parish level. As such, we calculate the level of Airbnb activity as the number of Airbnb listings either at the 
civil parish (just for Lisbon and Porto) or at the municipality levels using GIS techniques. We also calculate 
the number of listings in the Airbnb platform for each year using the reported entry date. 
Our socio-demographic area characteristics, the total number of lodgings and population at both 
municipality and civil parish levels were obtained from the 2011 Census. We further gather census data for 
each of the civil parishes on the number of lodgings per use type (residential, seasonal, rental, and other), 
the building age, housing density, population density, monthly cost of housing, population age and the 
average number of floors per building.  
Finally, it should be noted that in 2013 there was a reorganization of the administrative boundaries of 
the civil parishes in Portugal (Law 11-A/2013). This administrative reform required the reduction, the 
amalgamation or extinction of various civil parishes as an attempt to control spending in light of the 2012 
country sovereign debt crisis. The reform affected particularly the municipalities of Lisbon and Porto, which 
before the year 2013 had 53 and 15 civil parishes, but only 24 and 7 after, respectively. Since our Census 
data is from 2011, we had to convert the old civil parishes into the new parish divisions.  
Table A.1 in the Appendix provides the summary statistics for our sample. 
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4. Methodology  
Both Barron et al. (2018) and Sheppard and Udell (2018) present a simple theoretical model that 
explores the arguments that potentially justify an a priori view that Airbnb listings might have an impact on 
house prices. On the one hand, Airbnb provides homeowners with an increase in income which in turn 
results in an increase in their demand for residential space. Moreover, Airbnb also allows non-residents (e.g. 
tourists), who also demand living space, to occupy the city. Local incomes and population may further 
increase if Airbnb guests spend money nearby their Airbnb rentals. On the other hand, Airbnb guests can 
create negative externalities such as noise and congestion of publicly provided goods such as transportation. 
To the extent that these channels work on opposite directions on rent and property values, the theoretical 
net impact of Airbnb listings is ambiguous and provides motivation for an empirical investigation.  
Our goal in this paper is therefore to quantify the causal effect of short-term rentals on house prices and 
rents. We first start with a simple regression analysis and then introduce an instrumental variable estimator. 
However, because this first approach can at best estimate associational relations, we also employ a DiD 
approach that examines how the DL128/2014 policy reform has affected housing prices and rents in 
Portugal.    
 Simple regression analysis will suffer from standard endogeneity problems since, for example, house 
prices/rents as well as touristic value are both determined by the amenities and the characteristics of an area 
(omitted variables). To account for such amenities and characteristics, our OLS results condition on the 
percentage of run-down houses, housing and population density, population age, average dwelling age, 
average number of floors, ageing dependency (ratio of the number of people over age 64 to the number of 
people aged 15-64), population renovation (ratio of people in the age of 20-29 to the number of people in 
the age 55-64) and population longevity (ratio of the number of people over age 74  to the number of people 
over 64). All variables are measured at the municipality level. 
 
Baseline OLS Specifications 
Let Yit denote either the natural log of average house price or the natural log of average rent in 
municipality i in period t (where a period is a given quarter-year), AbbDensityit is the share of properties on 
Airbnb to the total number of houses in municipality i in period t and Covariatesi denote a vector of time-
invariant amenities in municipality i. Finally, τt  are year-quarter fixed effects and εit contains municipality 
level shocks to house prices or rents. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. In our baseline 
model our specification follows:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.                                                              (1) 
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We also report the results from a specification where we include municipality level fixed effects denoted 
by 𝜀𝑖 . Since all our covariates are time-invariant, in this specification their effects cannot be identified 
(multicollinearity). Hence in this case we obtain the following specification: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.                                                                                       (2) 
 
IV Specification 
Our baseline OLS results can nevertheless still be biased due to endogeneity issues and due to 
unobserved municipality-specific, time-varying factors contained in our error term that are correlated with 
Airbnb density. To address this concern, we follow Barron et al. (2018) and instrument tourism pressure 
with Google trends for the word “Airbnb” (𝐺𝑔𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡) interacted with a measure of how “touristy” a 
municipality is in the base quarter-year (𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑄1𝑌04). We define “touristy” to be a measure of a 
municipality’s attractiveness for tourists and proxy it using the share of Airbnb listings in the first quarter 
of 2014 (i.e. before the policy change). The policy was introduced in the third quarter of 2014. We use the 
first quarter of 2014 to avoid any anticipation effects of the policy so we avoid the second quarter. The fact 
that we use a pre-policy measure, it means that it is independent from any unexpected future shocks to local 
housing markets. Furthermore, the inclusion of municipality level fixed effects controls for the ex-ante 
sources of heterogeneity (omitted variables). This instrument is expected to explain the variation of short-
term rentals because areas that had a stronger presence of Airbnb before the policy are more likely to 
experience a growth of Airbnb over time as Airbnb becomes more in demand and property owners become 
more aware of the benefits of short-term rentals. Since the presence of Airbnb in the first quarter of 2014 
may signal how touristy a given municipality is, we test the instrument significance in the first stage 
regression. Moreover, the exposure of “high” versus “low” touristy municipalities to Airbnb over time is 
expected to have no direct effect on the housing market and is thus uncorrelated with house prices. The 
intuition for this second assumption rests on the exogeneity of the aggregated trend in Airbnb Google 
searches to local shocks on house prices. The necessary exclusion restriction that guarantees identification 
is then that the evaluation of Airbnb Google searches in high versus low touristy areas only affect house 
prices through its effects on the demand from tourism (share of Airbnb listings).  
The specification we use for the IV strategy is the following. In the first stage we predict Airbnb density 
in municipality i and time t as a function of Airbnb awareness (measured using Google trends) interacted 
with our “touristiness” measure that proxies how attractive a municipality is for tourists in the first quarter 
of the base year of 2014:  
 
𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑄1𝑌04 ∗ 𝐺𝑔𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 .                                        (3) 
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The second stage of our analysis computes the log of house prices or rental prices as a function of the 
predicted Airbnb density and all the same controls used in the first stage: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦̂ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.                                                                                         (4) 
 
However, the IV condition may be violated, and its validity is untestable (Barron et al. 2018). For the 
instrument to be valid it must be the case that it is uncorrelated with municipality-specific, time-varying 
shocks to the housing market, for instance gentrification. This requires that either ex-ante “touristiness” in 
2014 be independent of future municipality level shocks, or growth in Airbnb searches be independent of 
municipality-level shocks. Now suppose that there is a long-run trend towards gentrification, which leads 
to higher house prices over time. In addition, this gentrification trend is higher in more touristy areas.  Since 
there is also a systematic long-run trend in the time-series variable (Google trends), the instrument may no 
longer be independent from the error term. In this case our 2SLS estimates may reflect the effects of 
gentrification rather than home-sharing. While exogeneity of ex-ante “touristiness” to future shocks to the 
housing market are a plausible assumption, it is the differential growth of Airbnb online searches that is a 
potential source of concern. Therefore, we compare the IV estimates to our preferred method which uses a 
DiD estimator. This estimator exploits the policy change by comparing the evolution of house prices and 
rents in municipalities with high versus low presence of Airbnb. In addition to this binary measure of 
tourism, we also use the continuous measure of Airbnb density previously defined as the share of Airbnbs 
in the first quarter of 2014 (before the policy introduction).   
 
Difference-in-Differences  
To construct the DiD estimator we rely on the 2014 policy change which reduced the barriers to entry 
in the short-term rental market. As seen in section 4.3, registrations in RNAL spiked in the third quarter of 
2014, after the publication of the policy DL128/2014. The policy is not expected to have any effects in 
municipalities without tourism (control group) since these municipalities have low potential for Airbnb 
development. On the other hand, we hypothesize that the policy may have effects in the touristy 
municipalities since in these municipalities the liberalization will allow the Airbnb presence to increase and 
thus put upward pressure on house prices and rents. Summarizing, the only way the policy can affect house 
prices, is through its effect on Airbnb presence. The control group is thus composed by municipalities that 
have little to none ex-ante Airbnb listings (proxy for the “touristiness” of the municipality) and therefore 
not directly affected by the policy change while the treatment group is composed by municipalities with 
larger ex-ante Airbnb presence.  
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Table 3 ranks the top 6 municipalities by Airbnb presence (Table A.2 contains in the Appendix contains 
the ranking of the top 20 municipalities by Airbnb presence). The treatment group is then defined by these 
municipalities which have the largest Airbnb presence: Sta Maria Maior, Misericordia, Sto. Antonio, UF 
Cedofeita, S. Vicente, and Arroios. As a robustness check we expand this set of municipalities to also 
include the second set of municipalities by Airbnb presence: Bonfim, Peniche, Avenidas Novas (Lisboa), 
Mafra, Cascais, Penha de França (Lisboa), Grandola, Campolide (Lisboa), and Alvalade (Lisboa) as 
reported in Table A.2. We exclude nevertheless from the list, the municipalities in Portugal’s southernmost 
region of Algarve which we use as a placebo group (see Table A.2 for the construction of the treatment, 
treatment extended and placebo groups). The reason to exclude the municipalities in Algarve is because 
Algarve is the main beach and golf destination in Portugal and short-term rentals have been a strong presence 
in the region long before the existence of Airbnb and other similar short-term rentals platforms.  
We also report in Table A.2 the density of properties in the national registry (RNAL). The numbers 
confirm that the Algarve has a strong presence of short-term holiday homes although many are not present 
in Airbnb. For example, for the most popular municipality in the Algarve region, Albufeira, the density of 
Airbnb houses is 1.76% while the density of houses in the national registry is 2.91%.Therefore given that 
short-term rentals existed in the Algarve long before the existence of Airbnb, we do not expect to find an 
impact of the policy on house and rental prices in this region. 
 
Table 3: Density of short-term rentals (share of the number of houses in the municipality) – data for 
the 1
st
 quarters of 2014 and 2016. 
 1
ST
 QUARTER - 2014 3
RD
 QUARTER - 2016 
1 Sta. Maria Maior (Lisbon) – 13.0% Sta. Maria Maior (Lisbon) – 22.6% 
2 Misericórdia (Lisbon) – 11.3% Misericórdia (Lisbon) – 17.5% 
3 Sto. António (Lisbon) – 5.4%  Sto. António (Lisbon) – 10.3% 
4 UF Cedofeita, … (Porto) – 4.0% UF Cedofeita, … (Porto) – 8.8% 
5 S. Vicente (Lisbon) – 3.9% S. Vicente (Lisbon) – 7.9% 
6 Arroios (Lisbon) – 2.6% Arroios (Lisbon) – 5.3% 
 
We implement our DiD model as an interaction term between time and treatment group dummy 
variables in the regression model: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑄1𝑌04𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.                                                                  (5) 
 
A valid DiD for causal inference rests nevertheless on the stable unit treatment value assumption 
(SUTVA). SUTVA requires that the response of a particular unit should be unaffected by the particular 
assignment of treatments to the other units. Yet, this may prove difficult in urban settings because high 
treatment areas may affect contiguous low treatment areas through equilibrium effects (Rubin (2005), 
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Baum-Snow and Ferreira (2014)). One way to overcome this problem is to aggregate the data to the highest 
possible unit. In our analyses our unit of observation is either the municipality or the civil parish. It should 
be noted that within the context of our analyses, violation of the SUTVA would actually decrease the 
treatment effect from short-term rentals, as a strong treatment would increase not only the house price in its 
municipality but also in other municipalities, reducing the gap between the two. As such, in the case of a 
violation of SUTVA, the estimated treatment effect generated by the Airbnb becomes a lower bound and 
our results are a conservative estimate of the true effect.  
 
5. Results  
5.1. Is there empirical evidence that Airbnb has pushed house prices and rents up? 
The main results of our two empirical approaches are displayed in Tables 4 and 5.  
 
Simple OLS and IV Evidence 
Table 4-columns (1)-(4) report the simple OLS results of the log of house prices on the share of Airbnb 
listings in a given municipality, that is, density. The coefficient on density in Table 4- column (1), shows 
that without controls, moving from a municipality with no Airbnb listings to a municipality with a 10% 
share of Airbnbs results in a 77.8% increase in house prices. Once we include controls for municipality 
amenities and characteristics this estimate drops, a 10p.p. increase in the share of Airbnb listings in a 
municipality is associated with just a 46.3% increase in house prices (see Table 4- column (2)).11 We should 
note that these controls are time-invariant and do not account for other unobserved characteristics. In both 
cases, the other variables always have the expected signs and most are statistically significant. In Table 4-
column (3) we introduce municipality fixed effects and the estimated coefficient is further reduced from 
46% to 36%.  
Table 4-column (4) reports the 2SLS results using the instrumental variable with both municipality level 
and time fixed effects (and without the time invariant controls that are collinear with municipality fixed 
effects). The diagnostics show a very significant first stage (p-value<0.001) meaning that our instrument is 
relevant and a non-rejection of the exogeneity of the FE model of column (3) (p-value=0.362). Regarding 
our variable of interest, the IV results show only a small reduction of our previous estimate with the simple 
OLS-FE model. A 10p.p. increase in the share of Airbnb listings in a municipality is now associated with a 
34.9% increase in house prices.  
                                               
11 We should note that only two of our sample municipalities have more than 10% of properties on Airbnb – Santa 
Maria Maior and Misericordia  and only five municipalities have a concentration above 5% - Arroios, Lagos, São 
Vicente, Santo António, and UF Cedofeita.  
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Table 4-columns (5)-(8) repeat the regressions when the dependent variable is the logarithm of rent 
values. As with the house price regressions, we find that controlling for municipality amenities and 
characteristics is important, as the estimated effect of Airbnb listings increases substantially when controls 
are excluded. Further, it is worth noting, that as in the case of house prices, in the rent regression the 2SLS 
estimate (column (8)) and the FE estimate with municipality fixed effects (Column (7)) have very different 
magnitudes. Finally, for rents we reject the validity of the OLS-FE model (p-value=0.01). This suggests that 
omitted factors such as gentrification may be positively correlated with Airbnb listings for the case of rents, 
thus creating a positive bias.  
 
Table 4: OLS and IV estimates of the effect of the concentration of Airbnb listings in a 
municipality on average home sale prices and average rents. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Method: OLS OLS FE IV OLS OLS FE IV 
Dep. Variable: log(sales) log(rents) 
Airbnb density 7.783*** 4.633*** 3.625*** 3.491*** 6.050*** 1.473** 0.436** 0.379** 
 (1.215) (1.019) (0.416) (0.417) (0.981) (0.707) (0.191) (0.191) 
                  
Observations 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 
R2-adjusted 0.175 0.806 0.920 0.920 0.165 0.895 0.955 0.955 
IV first stage 
(pval)    0.000    0.000 
Endogeneity 
(pval)       0.362       0.010 
Quarter-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Covariates No Yes No No No Yes No No 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the municipality level. Simple OLS results reported in columns (1) and (5) and with municipality level 
covariates in columns (2) and (6). Columns (3) and (7)  introduce fixed effects at the municipality level. The instrument in columns (4) and (8) is the 
interaction of Google time trends for the  word “Airbnb” times the share of properties on Airbnb in the first quarter of 2014 (before the policy). 
 
Causal Effects by Difference-in-Differences: Mainland Portugal 
The results presented before cannot be given a clear causal interpretation. In particular, the Airbnb 
measure is time varying and may be correlated with other unobserved time-varying factors such as 
gentrification. The problem may be mitigated with the use of the instrument but we have no way of testing 
its validity. Furthermore, there might be an upward or a downward bias to the estimated effects given the 
nature of Airbnb density growth. To properly evaluate the causal impact of Airbnb listings on house prices 
and rents, we instead rely on a quasi-experimental design that uses a difference-in-differences technique. 
We estimate the effect of a specific intervention in the short-rental market (enactment of policy 
DL128/2014) by comparing the changes in house prices and rents over time between properties that are 
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located in high-Airbnb awareness (the treatment group) and low-Airbnb awareness. We implement our DiD 
model as an interaction term between time and treatment group dummy variables in the regression model 
as explained in section 4. Table 5 presents our DiD results. We also perform several robustness checks by 
varying the definition of the treatment group and by constructing a placebo group. The placebo group in our 
case are areas that have large presence of short-term rentals but that already existed before the entry of 
Airbnb – the municipalities in the Algarve region. All our regressions include the controls described in the 
previous section and year-quarter and municipality fixed effects.  
 
Table 5: DiD estimates of the effect of the concentration of Airbnb listings in a municipality on 
average home sale prices and average rents.  
  (1) (5) 
Dep. Variable log(sales) log(rents) 
Treatment (dummy) 0.818*** 0.902*** 
(0.0210) (0.00777) 
Treatment x 2014 0.135 -0.0137 
(0.0813) (0.0214) 
Treatment x 2015 0.260*** 0.0413* 
(0.0502) (0.0220) 
Treatment x 2016 0.340*** 0.109** 
(0.0652) (0.0427) 
Observations 1,213 1,356 
R2-adjusted 1.000 0.998 
Quarter-year FE Yes Yes 
Municipality FE Yes Yes 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. The treatment group are 
the parishes of UF Cedofeita, Sto António, Sta Maria Maior, Misericórdia, Arroios, 
and S Vicente. The control group are all remaining parishes in Lisbon and Porto and 
all remaining municipalities across the country. 
 
From Table 5 we see that house prices in the treated municipalities have increased by 34.0% in 2016 
compared to prices in the control municipalities. Rents also increased by 10.9%. These percentages are 
directly comparable to our previous regression results. For the comparison we need to multiply the estimated 
effects from Table 4 with the average Airbnb density in the treatment group, which is 11.2% for the first 
quarter of 2016. We should remind the reader that in Table 4 the explanatory variable was the 
contemporaneous Airbnb density in municipality i and period t while in the DiD the explanatory variable is 
the density of Airbnb in the 1st quarter of 2014. The values are thus substantially different given that Airbnb 
presence was growing over the period. As such, the average estimates from columns (2) and (6) of Table 4 
give us an estimated increase of 51.8% (=4.63*0.112) for house prices and 16.5% (=1.47*0.112) for rents 
while using the estimates from columns (3) and (7) we obtain an estimated effect of 40.6% (=3.63*0.112) 
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for house prices and 4.9% (=0.436*0.112) for rents. These numbers compare with our DiD estimate of 
34.0% for house prices and 10.9% for rents. 
5.2. Robustness Checks  
To evaluate the robustness of our previous results we start by extending the set of treated municipalities 
to make sure our results are not a mere statistical occurrence due to our definition of high and low Airbnb 
presence. Second, we want to make sure our results are not due to differences in house prices evolution 
between urban and non-urban areas so we restrict our set of municipalities to the urban areas of Lisbon and 
Porto. Third, we perform a placebo test on similar municipalities (by presence of Airbnb) but where the 
effect of Airbnb on house prices should not be present. In the final robustness exercise we use a continuous 
treatment variable instead of the binary definition. This way we have a varying level of treatment across 
municipality depending on the presence of Airbnb (Airbnb density). 
 
Table 6: Robustness checks: DiD estimates of the effect of the concentration of Airbnb listings in a 
municipality on average home sale prices and average rents. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. Variable log(sales)   log(rents) 
Treatment 
(dummy) 
0.818*** 0.836*** -0.0626*** 0.351*** 0.902*** 0.814*** 0.0810*** 0.328*** 
(0.0210) (0.0189) (0.0211) (0.0113) (0.00777) (0.00634) (0.00708) (0.00835) 
Treatment x 2014 0.135 0.0719 0.111 -0.0451 -0.0137 0.0133 -0.0150 -0.0348** 
 (0.0813) (0.0497) (0.0807) (0.0308) (0.0214) (0.0149) (0.0228) (0.0150) 
Treatment x 2015 0.260*** 0.155*** 0.225*** 0.00430 0.0413* 0.0348** 0.0155 -0.0126 
 (0.0502) (0.0483) (0.0517) (0.0283) (0.0220) (0.0156) (0.0227) (0.0198) 
Treatment x 2016 0.340*** 0.212*** 0.308*** 0.0444 0.109** 0.0990*** 0.0588 -0.0575 
  (0.0652) (0.0563) (0.0686) (0.0332) (0.0427) (0.0341) (0.0437) (0.0391) 
Observations 1,213 1,213 507 1,112 1,356 1,356 557 1,255 
R2-adjusted 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998 0.998 0.999 0.998 
Quarter-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Notes: The treatment group are the parishes of UF Cedofeita, Sto António, Sta Maria Maior, Misericórdia, Arroios, and S Vicente. The control group are all  
remaining parishes in Lisbon and Porto and all remaining municipalities across the country. Columns (2) and (6) extended the treatment group to further include 
the municipalities of Bonfim, Peniche, Avenidas Novas (Lisboa), Mafra, Cascais, Penha de França (Lisboa), Grandola, Campolide (Lisboa), and Alvalade (Lisboa). 
Columns (3) and (7) restrict the control group to only include the remaining parishes in Lisbon and Porto as well as the two largest suburban municipalities of 
Lisbon - Amadora and Odivelas. Columns (4) and (8) contain the results for the placebo group where the treatment group are all the municipalities of the region of 
the Algarve and the original treatment group is excluded. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level.  
 
Causal Effects by Difference-in-Differences: Extended set of treated Municipalities 
Table 6 presents our Robustness checks. The first robustness check extends the definition of the 
treatment and control groups. In this specification, we further include in our treatment group the 
municipalities of Bonfim, Peniche, Avenidas Novas (Lisboa), Mafra, Cascais, Penha de França (Lisboa), 
Grandola, Campolide (Lisboa), and Alvalade (Lisboa). As explained above, these are the second set of 
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municipalities ranked by density of Airbnb presence (see the rankings in Table A.2). As reported in column 
(2) of Table 6, the average effect on sales is reduced to 21.2%. This is expected since the average density is 
now 5.7% which is half of the previous 11.1% and so the coefficient is thus roughly reduced by slightly 
more than half, consistent with a linear effect of the density of Airbnb listings on house prices. On the other 
hand, reported in columns (6) of Table 6, the effect on rental prices remains similar at 9.9%, which suggests 
a non-linear effect of Airbnb density for the rental markets. 
 
Causal Effects by Difference-in-Differences: High population density areas only 
The fact that the treated municipalities are mostly urban and the control municipalities are mostly non-
urban can potentially undermine our findings since other factors may explain the differential evolution of 
house prices in the urban vs non-urban areas. To exclude municipality differences as an explanatory reason 
for our findings we obtain a comparable set of municipalities for the treatment and control groups and restrict 
analysis to this subset of municipalities. To operationalize this comparison we restrict analysis to the urban 
municipalities that exhibit the largest house density in the country. To obtain this set of homogenous 
treatment and control groups, we select the subset of municipalities and civil parishes with a house density 
above 1,500 per squared km. This results in a treatment and control group that includes all the civil parishes 
of Lisbon and Porto together with two suburban municipalities of Lisbon – Amadora and Odivelas. The 
results in columns (3) and (7) of Table 6 show that the effect on house prices remains similar at 30.8%. This 
implies that our results are not driven by differences between urban and non-urban areas. Even within urban 
areas there is a distinct evolution of house prices between high and low Airbnb municipalities. The effect 
on rental prices is reduced to 5.9% and becomes statistically insignificant, possibly due to the much smaller 
sample sizes. 
 
Causal Effects by Difference-in-Differences: Placebo tests 
The placebo tests involve constructing a placebo group. In the placebo group the effect should not be 
present and finding it would suggest a misspecified design. As a placebo group we select a set of 
municipalities similar to the treated group but where the impact of Airbnb should not be present. Given the 
large tradition of the Algarve region as a beach destination with many holiday homes available for rental, it 
is also a region with large presence on Airbnb (see Table A.2). However, we make a distinction between 
the traditional markets for holiday homes, such as beach destinations, and the recent trend in short-term 
rentals potentiated by Airbnb. Short-term rentals are mostly an urban phenomenon, unlike beach holiday 
homes. Beach destinations have had for a long time an organized market for rental of these properties and 
the housing market is thus not expected to be strongly affected by the “new” online platforms such as 
Airbnb. This is because it is not expected to generate an increase in demand for short-term rentals in these 
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areas, since they have already such a market in place. Airbnb is thus not expected to have an effect on house 
prices for these areas. It is similar to the treated group by the large presence of Airbnb and short-term rentals 
but we do not expect an impact of Airbnb presence on house prices because these short-term rentals already 
existed before the entry of Airbnb into the market. Finally, we exclude the baseline treatment group from 
the analysis to avoid contamination of the control group. The results in columns (4) and (8) of Table 6 show 
that we find no effect of Airbnb in the placebo groups. We thus have no evidence of design misspecification 
for our baseline results  
 
Table 7:– Differences-in-differences estimates for the effect of the concentration of short-term rentals 
on average prices. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Variable log(sales) log(rents) 
Airbnb Density x 2014 1.295 0.937 1.530 -0.180 -0.241 0.655 
 (0.984) (0.943) (2.372) (0.339) (0.377) (2.151) 
AirbnbDensity x 2015 3.684*** 3.078*** 5.793** 0.303 -0.0977 -0.158 
 (0.797) (0.717) (2.250) (0.310) (0.252) (2.069) 
AirbnbDensity x 2016 4.500*** 4.023*** 2.329 2.264*** 1.282** 5.755 
  (0.959) (0.947) (4.006) (0.457) (0.520) (7.735) 
Observations 1,213 456 757 1,356 506 850 
R2 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998 0.999 0.998 
Quarter-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Notes: Airbnb Density is defined as the number of properties on Airbnb in the first quarter of 2014 divided number of lodgings in 
the region. Columns (2) and (5) restrict to the parishes in Lisbon and Porto, while columns (3) and (6) only use the municipalities 
outside Lisbon and Porto. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level. 
 
Causal Effects by Difference-in-Differences: Continuous treatment effect (Airbnb density) 
Finally, we use also the continuous treatment metric (share of Airbnb to the total number of lodgings) 
in the first quarter of 2014 interacted with the post 2014 dummy. Table 7 reports larger estimated 
coefficients. For example, a municipality with an Airbnb density of 10% is expected to experience an 
increase in prices of 45.0% when compared to a municipality without the presence of local accommodation. 
The effect is 22.6% for rents. However, we must quantify these effects at the level of the density as defined 
in the first quarter of 2014. In this period the maximal density was 11.7% (instead of 20.7% by the end of 
2016) and the average density for the municipalities placed in the treatment group was 5.9% (instead of 
11.2% by the end of 2016). So we get larger estimated coefficients while the corrected estimated effects are 
of 52.6% on prices (=4.50*0.117) and 13.4% on rents (=2.26*0.059). Columns (2) and (5) report the results 
for the municipalities of Lisbon and Porto only, with similar results for house prices and a reduction to half 
the effect for rental prices. In columns (3) and (6) we report the results just for the rest of the country, 
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excluding Lisbon and Porto. Both effects become statistically insignificant outside the two main cities. This 
is consistent with the presence of local accommodation in urban centers. It is in the main and most important 
urban centers where we can find the largest increases in house prices. 
 
6. Conclusions  
Since it was founded in 2008, the short-term rental platform Airbnb has been the subject of critics that 
have blamed it for raising housing prices, changing employment dynamics and the quality of life of 
residential neighborhoods, and triggering gentrification and displacement of residents from central and 
urban historic zones. However, causal evidence on how Airbnb and other home-sharing platforms affect 
housing markets is mostly lacking, despite several cities worldwide have already reacted to the rise of 
Airbnb with different policy interventions, varying from laissez faire to prohibition to allowing it with 
certain restrictions. 
This paper quantified the effect of an increase in the concentration of short-term rentals on house prices 
and rents. We focus our analysis in Portugal, taking advantage of a policy reform that took place in 2014 
and which has liberalized the rental housing market for the entire country by facilitating the registration and 
set up of informal short-term rental businesses. Using a difference-in-differences empirical strategy we show 
that there was a 34% increase in property values and a 10.9% increase in rents between the introduction of 
the policy DL128/2014 until 2016 for areas with strongest presence of Airbnb. The numbers can be 
translated also into the effect of Airbnb density. As such, a 1 p.p. increase in the share of Airbnb properties 
translates into a 4.5% increase in house prices and a 2.26% increase in rent values. The effects are mostly 
localized to the historical sites of the two largest cities in Portugal, Lisbon and Porto, particularly in their 
historical centers, which exhibit levels of concentration of short-term rentals above the average. This may 
be due not only to geographical constraints but also to specific preferences by tourists who create extra 
demand pressure on these locations. 
These effects are also not trivial, implying that even within historical centers large discrepancies have 
arisen solely due to the higher presence of short-term rentals. This should not be ignored, as these effects 
are far from neutral from a distributional point of view (see for example Koster et al. 2019). It can also lead 
to long-term impact in the historical centers, as locals move elsewhere. Despite the distributional concerns 
and the potential displacement of existing residents, this increase in house prices has also created incentives 
for dwellings in historical centers to be renovated and redeveloped. This process in turn has helped rebirth 
some of these old areas of the city by attracting younger population to invest and move in and through a 
gentrification process that has attracted people with higher incomes and also more upscale urban amenities 
and services. The study of these consequences should be the subject of future research. 
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Finally, it should be noted that Lisbon and Porto have already introduced tourist taxes in 2016 and 2018, 
respectively, to help cope with increased pressures. The Algarve region also voted to follow suit in March 
2018 (yet to be implemented). Moreover, these cities are currently weighting the benefits of expanding 
tourism accommodation at the expense of domestic housing, upmarket condominiums rather than affordable 
homes.12 In addition, as of July 1st 2017 accommodation rental websites such as Airbnb risk fines up to 
€32,500 if they run ads for properties in Portugal without displaying AL registration numbers. The AL 
registration number is the vacation home’s identification number and signs that the offering is fully 
compliant with vacation rental laws and thus can be opened for business. The new decree law covers both 
the website and the property owner or promoter and a scale of fines has been published.13 The idea of this 
new rule is to reinforce the message that the registration of short-term rentals or Alojamento Local is 
mandatory by pushing illegal rentals off accommodation websites. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 – Summary statistics. Observations at the municipality-year-quarter level. 
Variable Count Mean S.d. Min Max 
Prices (sales: €/m2) 1380 1,273 526 374 3,670 
Prices (rents: €/m2) 1380 6.27 2.05 2.91 13.32 
Number of lodgings 1380 49,724 52,960 7,640 323,981 
Number of Airbnb properties 1380 695 1,420 2 9,273 
Number of registered properties 
(RNAL) 1380 463 962 1 5,804 
Deteriorated houses (%) 1380 5 3 0 18 
House density (N/km2) 1380 2,482 2,775 22 10,692 
Population density (N/km2) 1380 4,027 4,001 36 14,682 
Housing cost (€/month) 1380 433 55 321 589 
Population age 1380 43 3 36 47 
House age 1380 47 17 24 91 
Ageing index 1380 153 62 59 286 
Dependency index (elterly) 1380 31 9 16 50 
Dependency index (youth) 1380 22 3 14 28 
Dependency index (total) 1380 53 7 41 71 
Sustainability index 1380 3.5 1.0 2.0 6.4 
Population renovation index 1380 95 11 72 143 
Longevity index 1380 48 5 40 63 
Number of floors per building 1380 2.8 1.1 1.4 6.0 
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Table A.2 – Ranking of the top 20 municipalities by Airbnb density and definition of the members of the treatment, treatment 
extended and placebo groups. 
Municipality Density of 
Airbnb Q1Y04 
Density of 
RNAL Q1Y04 
Treatment Treatment 
Extended 
Placebo 
Sta Maria Maior 12,99% 0,00% x     
Misericórdia 11,34% 0,90% x   
Sto António 5,42% 0,00% x   
UF Cedofeita, St 3,96% 0,00% x   
S Vicente 3,86% 0,00% x   
Arroios 2,63% 0,26% x   
Lagos 2,56% 1,19%   x 
Albufeira 1,76% 2,91%   x 
Bonfim 1,64% 0,18%  x  
Peniche 1,54% 0,25%  x  
Tavira 1,34% 1,73%   x 
Avenidas Novas 1,31% 0,11%  x  
Mafra 1,12% 0,14%  x  
Loulé 0,90% 0,24%   x 
Cascais 0,74% 0,03%  x  
Penha de França 0,71% 0,06%  x  
Grândola 0,68% 0,15%  x  
Portimão 0,67% 1,84%   x 
Campolide 0,63% 0,00%  x  
Olhão 0,62% 1,01%   x 
Silves 0,58% 0,54%   x 
Alvalade 0,56% 0,01%  x  
Faro 0,52% 0,12%     x 
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